Techniques › T1564 › T1564.011
T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts
stealth — Linux, macOS, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1564.011
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such as when the user of the active session logs off. These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts to pause or terminate specified running processes.</p><p>Adversaries may invoke processes using
nohup, PowerShell -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue, or similar commands that may be immune to hangups. This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.</p><p>Hiding from process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike Trap this does not establish Persistence since the process will not be re-invoked once actually terminated.</p>KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0067 Detection Strategy for Ignore Process Interrupts v1.0
AN0181 LinuxExecution of processes using nohup or shell redirection to ignore SIGHUP and continue running after session termination. Defender perspective: correlation between commands including nohup, disowned jobs, or
&suffix with continued process execution after parent terminal exit.Tunable:IgnoredSignalsProcessLifetimeThresholdAN0182 WindowsPowerShell or script execution with parameters that suppress errors or ignore user interrupts, such as-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue. Defender perspective: detecting discrepancies between suppressed error arguments and continued execution behavior.Tunable:MonitoredCmdletsErrorActionThresholdAN0183 macOSUse of nohup, disown, or AppleScript constructs to suppress process interrupts. Defender perspective: commands containing nohup or hidden background tasks (osascriptwith persistent execution) correlated with processes surviving user logouts.Tunable:WatchedShellsPersistenceCorrelationWindow
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1564.011
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1564) 10
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: frack113
· 2021-06-04 (modified 2022-08-02) · logsource: product=windows category=sysmon_status · 1f2b5353-573f-4880-8e33-7d04dcf97744
Detects when an attacker tries to hide from Sysmon by disabling or stopping it
Author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-02-24 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 2ff692c2-4594-41ec-8fcb-46587de769e0
Detects disabling the CrashDump per registry (as used by HermeticWiper)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-05-08 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 5722dff1-4bdd-4949-86ab-fbaf707e767a
Detects the execution of System Informer, a task manager tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level operations
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-02-25 (modified 2024-07-12) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a
Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.
Author: frack113
· 2022-09-05 (modified 2023-12-11) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654
Detect creation of suspicious executable file names.
Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-10 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42
Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc).
Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
Author: frack113
· 2021-06-04 (modified 2026-07-23) · logsource: product=windows category=sysmon_error · 815cd91b-7dbc-4247-841a-d7dd1392b0a8
Detects when an adversary is trying to hide it's action from Sysmon logging based on error messages
Author: Janantha Marasinghe
· 2020-09-26 (modified 2025-07-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bab049ca-7471-4828-9024-38279a4c04da
Adversaries can carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. This rule is built to detect the registration of the Virtualbox driver or start of a Virtualbox VM.
Author: frack113
· 2022-01-21 (modified 2023-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18
Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
Author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
· 2023-01-12 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · ec52985a-d024-41e3-8ff6-14169039a0b3
Detects execution of the "mount" command with "hidepid" parameter to make invisible processes to other users from the system