kevmap

TechniquesT1564 › T1564.006

T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance

stealth — ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON

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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1564.006
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.</p><p>Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.</p><p>Threat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of .wsb configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the <MappedFolder> property supports the creation of a shared folder, while the <LogonCommand> property allows the specification of a payload.</p><p>In VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid .vmx file with the /bin/vmx utility. Adding this command to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh (i.e., RC Scripts) will cause the VM to persistently restart. Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.</p>

KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer

None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.

Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2

Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1564.006

Author: frack113 · 2022-04-09 · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 42d36aa1-3240-4db0-8257-e0118dcdd9cd
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection
Techniques: T1564.006
Author: Janantha Marasinghe · 2020-09-26 (modified 2025-07-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bab049ca-7471-4828-9024-38279a4c04da
Adversaries can carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. This rule is built to detect the registration of the Virtualbox driver or start of a Virtualbox VM.
Techniques: T1564.006T1564

Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1564) 10

These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.

Author: frack113 · 2021-06-04 (modified 2022-08-02) · logsource: product=windows category=sysmon_status · 1f2b5353-573f-4880-8e33-7d04dcf97744
Detects when an attacker tries to hide from Sysmon by disabling or stopping it
Techniques: T1564
Author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-24 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 2ff692c2-4594-41ec-8fcb-46587de769e0
Detects disabling the CrashDump per registry (as used by HermeticWiper)
Techniques: T1564T1112
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2023-05-08 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 5722dff1-4bdd-4949-86ab-fbaf707e767a
Detects the execution of System Informer, a task manager tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level operations
Techniques: T1082T1564T1543
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-25 (modified 2024-07-12) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a
Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.
Techniques: T1564T1059
Author: frack113 · 2022-09-05 (modified 2023-12-11) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654
Detect creation of suspicious executable file names. Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths.
Techniques: T1564
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-10-10 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42
Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc). Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options. Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
Techniques: T1622T1564T1543
Author: frack113 · 2021-06-04 (modified 2026-07-23) · logsource: product=windows category=sysmon_error · 815cd91b-7dbc-4247-841a-d7dd1392b0a8
Detects when an adversary is trying to hide it's action from Sysmon logging based on error messages
Techniques: T1564
Author: Janantha Marasinghe · 2020-09-26 (modified 2025-07-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bab049ca-7471-4828-9024-38279a4c04da
Adversaries can carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. This rule is built to detect the registration of the Virtualbox driver or start of a Virtualbox VM.
Techniques: T1564.006T1564
Author: frack113 · 2022-01-21 (modified 2023-01-05) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18
Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
Techniques: T1564
Author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk · 2023-01-12 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · ec52985a-d024-41e3-8ff6-14169039a0b3
Detects execution of the "mount" command with "hidepid" parameter to make invisible processes to other users from the system
Techniques: T1564