Techniques › T1134 › T1134.004
T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing
stealth · privilege escalation — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1134.004
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use. This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.</p><p>Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment. This spoofing could be executed via Visual Basic within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.</p><p>Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0489 Behavior-chain detection for T1134.004 Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing (Windows) v1.0
AN1351 WindowsA process explicitly forges its parent using EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO + PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS (UpdateProcThreadAttribute → CreateProcess[A/W]/CreateProcessAsUserW) or other Native API paths, resulting in mismatched/implausible lineage across ETW EventHeader ProcessId, Security 4688 Creator Process ID/Name, and sysmon ParentProcessGuid. Often paired with privilege escalation when the chosen parent runs as SYSTEM.etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process
api_call: UpdateProcThreadAttribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS) and CreateProcess* with EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT / StartupInfoEx→ DC0021 OS API Executionetw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processprocess_start: EventHeader.ProcessId true parent vs reported PPID mismatch→ DC0034 Process MetadataTunable:TimeWindowAllowedSpoofersParentPrivilegeDeltaThresholdLineageMismatchToleranceSensitiveParents
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1134.004
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-07-23 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d
Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1134) 4
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
· 2021-12-20 (modified 2025-10-19) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
Author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)
· 2024-01-05 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-07-23 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d2b7a134-9c3e-4f8a-b56d-e0c1f8a29b47
Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-07-23 · logsource: product=windows service=security · e3c6d245-7b8f-4e2a-c17f-a9d0e5b38f62
Detects potentially suspicious explicit credential logon events where the user
is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are
different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting
to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account.