kevmap

TechniquesT1053 › T1053.005

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

execution · persistence · privilege escalation — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON

1
MITRE detection strategy
1
analytics
51
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1053.005
2
KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet Invoke-CimMethod, which leverages WMI class PS_ScheduledTask to create a scheduled task via an XML path.</p><p>An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.</p><p>Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from schtasks /query and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., Index value) within associated registry keys.</p>

KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer

CVEVendor / productMapping typeStateAdded
CVE-2023-46604Apache ActiveMQ secondary impact Mapped2023-11-02
CVE-2021-34473Microsoft Exchange Server primary impact Mapped2021-11-03

Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2

Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1053.005

Author: @kostastsale · 2022-01-10 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0a74c5a9-1b71-4475-9af2-7829d320d5c2
Detects execution of ChromeLoader malware via a registered scheduled task
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-07-28 (modified 2022-11-18) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 · 2019-12-20 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) · 2025-02-05 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1d174d38-8fda-4081-a9b6-56d9763c0cd8
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them. This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-09-09 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 24c8392b-aa3c-46b7-a545-43f71657fe98
Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Rory Duncan · 2025-07-14 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 2daa93a0-a5fb-41c5-8cd8-3c11294bfd1f
Detects the creation of new scheduled tasks via commandline, using Schtasks.exe. This rule detects tasks creating that call OpenSSH, which may indicate the creation of reverse SSH tunnel to the attacker's server.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: frack113 · 2021-12-28 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 363eccc0-279a-4ccf-a3ab-24c2e63b11fb
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2021-03-11 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 39019a4e-317f-4ce3-ae63-309a8c6b53c5
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-12-05 (modified 2022-12-07) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 3a734d25-df5c-4b99-8034-af1ddb5883a4
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation events. Based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2023-10-24 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 3b8e5084-4de9-449a-a40d-0e11014f2e2d
Detects registry event related to the creation of a scheduled task used by Diamond Sleet APT during exploitation of Team City CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel · 2024-09-02 · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 3b92a1d0-8d4b-4d28-a1b4-1e29d49a6a3e
Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory. The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object. Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-12-05 (modified 2023-02-07) · logsource: product=windows service=taskscheduler · 424273ea-7cf8-43a6-b712-375f925e481f
Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's an unusale program to be run from a Scheduled Task
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009) · 2021-06-18 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d
Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
Techniques: T1053T1053.005
Author: David Strassegger, Tim Shelton · 2021-01-22 (modified 2023-01-20) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 4f86b304-3e02-40e3-aa5d-e88a167c9617
Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community · 2018-03-23 (modified 2023-03-08) · logsource: product=windows service=system · 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Author: Markus Neis, @Karneades · 2018-03-06 (modified 2023-03-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 56c217c3-2de2-479b-990f-5c109ba8458f
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.001
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-12-05 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4
Detects update to a scheduled task event that contain suspicious keywords.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel · 2024-07-03 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 64a871dd-83f6-4e5f-80fc-5a7ca3a8a819
Detects Kapeka backdoor persistence activity. Depending on the process privileges, the Kapeka dropper then sets persistence for the backdoor either as a scheduled task (if admin or SYSTEM) or autorun registry (if not). For the scheduled task, it creates a scheduled task called "Sens Api" via schtasks command, which is set to run upon system startup as SYSTEM. To establish persistence through the autorun utility, it adds an autorun entry called "Sens Api" under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run via the "reg add" command. Both persistence mechanisms are set to launch the binary by calling rundll32 and passing the backdoor's first export ordinal (#1) without any additional argument.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel · 2024-07-03 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 6c130acd-0adb-4545-bcc4-2e85d0883c9a
Detects Kapeka backdoor scheduled task creation based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Lednyov Alexey, oscd.community, Sreeman · 2020-10-16 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 73a883d0-0348-4be4-a8d8-51031c2564f8
Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key. Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections. This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run. The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 · 2019-12-20 (modified 2022-11-27) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-12-05 (modified 2023-03-13) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad
Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by deleting or disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-08-31 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 7a02e22e-b885-4404-b38b-1ddc7e65258a
Detects scheduled task creations or modification to be run with high privileges on a suspicious schedule type
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community · 2018-03-23 (modified 2023-03-08) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5
Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-21 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 81325ce1-be01-4250-944f-b4789644556f
Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2023-07-18 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 86588b36-c6d3-465f-9cee-8f9093e07798
Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.001
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-07-28 (modified 2025-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 89ca78fd-b37c-4310-b3d3-81a023f83936
Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-04-15 (modified 2022-11-18) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 8a8379b8-780b-4dbf-b1e9-31c8d112fefb
Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2019-01-16 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 92626ddd-662c-49e3-ac59-f6535f12d189
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Olaf Hartong · 2019-05-22 (modified 2023-01-26) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 931b6802-d6a6-4267-9ffa-526f57f22aaf
Detects potential exploitation of the BearLPE exploit using Task Scheduler ".job" import arbitrary DACL write\par
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Center for Threat Informed Defense (CTID) Summiting the Pyramid Team · 2023-09-27 · logsource: product=windows category=registry_event · 93ff0ceb-e0ef-4586-8cd8-a6c277d738e3
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via Registry keys.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-23 (modified 2024-05-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 9494479d-d994-40bf-a8b1-eea890237021
Detects the execution of "schtasks.exe" from a parent that is located in a potentially suspicious location. Multiple malware strains were seen exhibiting a similar behavior in order to achieve persistence.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1) · 2019-03-04 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 958d81aa-8566-4cea-a565-59ccd4df27b0
Detects the deactivation and disabling of the Scheduled defragmentation task as seen by Slingshot APT group
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems) · 2022-07-15 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 970823b7-273b-460a-8afc-3a6811998529
Detects scheduled task creation events that include suspicious actions, and is run once at 00:00
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2020-05-26 (modified 2025-10-19) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c
Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) · 2025-02-05 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 9f8573c9-22b4-40e3-89c1-72bc2b8d49ab
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.
Author: Center for Threat Informed Defense (CTID) Summiting the Pyramid Team · 2023-09-27 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · a762e74f-4dce-477c-b023-4ed81df600f9
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via file creation.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Samir Bousseaden · 2019-04-03 (modified 2024-09-04) · logsource: product=windows service=security · a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2
Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-04-08 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df
Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.001
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community · 2018-03-23 (modified 2023-03-08) · logsource: product=windows service=security · c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport, X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-12 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78
Detects the creation of a schtask that potentially executes a base64 encoded payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.001
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-03-15 (modified 2022-07-28) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967
Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.001
OilRig APT Activity criticaltest
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community · 2018-03-23 (modified 2023-03-08) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Author: @kostastsale · 2022-03-21 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d5eb7432-fda4-4bba-a37f-ffa74d9ed639
Detects post exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. According to Proofpoint, one of the commands that the backdoor ran was via creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method. It creates a fictitious windows event and a trigger in which once the event is created, it executes the payload.
Techniques: T1053.005T1059.006
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Elastic (idea) · 2023-04-20 (modified 2024-12-01) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · dd2a821e-3b07-4d3b-a9ac-929fe4c6ca0c
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence
Techniques: T1036.005T1053.005
Author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) · 2022-02-07 (modified 2023-03-18) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e1118a8f-82f5-44b3-bb6b-8a284e5df602
Detects specific process parameters as used by ACTINIUM scheduled task persistence creation.
Techniques: T1053T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-12-05 (modified 2023-02-07) · logsource: product=windows service=taskscheduler · f0767f15-0fb3-44b9-851e-e8d9a6d0005d
Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the program being run is located in a suspicious location or where it is an unusual program to be run from a Scheduled Task
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-23 (modified 2024-03-19) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f2c64357-b1d2-41b7-849f-34d2682c0fad
Detects scheduled task creation using "schtasks" that contain potentially suspicious or uncommon commands
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Sreeman · 2020-09-29 (modified 2023-02-10) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f548a603-c9f2-4c89-b511-b089f7e94549
Detects manual execution of the "Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser" task via schtasks. In order to trigger persistence stored in the "\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" registry key.
Techniques: T1053.005
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) · 2025-11-27 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4
Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks. One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe. Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.
Techniques: T1036.003T1053.005
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2022-10-31 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · ff2fff64-4cd6-4a2b-ba7d-e28a30bbe66b
Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name
Techniques: T1053.005

Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1053) 12

These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.

Author: Thomas Patzke · 2020-05-22 (modified 2023-11-06) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
Author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz · 2022-01-01 · logsource: product=rpc_firewall category=application · 0fcd1c79-4eeb-4746-aba9-1b458f7a79cb
Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via ATSvc
Techniques: T1053T1053.002
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-09-15 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 26488ad0-f9fd-4536-876f-52fea846a2e4
Detects the execution of the hacktool SharPersist - used to deploy various different kinds of persistence mechanisms
Techniques: T1053
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2022-02-25 (modified 2023-03-08) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
Author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009) · 2021-06-18 (modified 2025-10-22) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d
Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
Techniques: T1053T1053.005
Author: Austin Clark · 2019-08-12 (modified 2025-04-28) · logsource: product=cisco service=aaa · 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2021-11-16 (modified 2022-01-12) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations
Techniques: T1053
Author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz · 2022-01-01 · logsource: product=rpc_firewall category=application · ace3ff54-e7fd-46bd-8ea0-74b49a0aca1d
Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task
Techniques: T1053T1053.002
Author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz · 2022-01-01 · logsource: product=rpc_firewall category=application · aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0
Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via SASec
Techniques: T1053T1053.002
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2021-03-09 (modified 2023-03-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group activity (or related) on Exchange servers
Techniques: T1546T1053
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1) · 2019-03-04 (modified 2022-11-27) · logsource: product=windows service=security · c5a178bf-9cfb-4340-b584-e4df39b6a3e7
Detects the deactivation and disabling of the Scheduled defragmentation task as seen by Slingshot APT group
Techniques: T1053
Author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) · 2022-02-07 (modified 2023-03-18) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e1118a8f-82f5-44b3-bb6b-8a284e5df602
Detects specific process parameters as used by ACTINIUM scheduled task persistence creation.
Techniques: T1053T1053.005