Techniques › T1665
T1665 Hide Infrastructure
command and control — ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1665
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools, masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers, and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.</p><p>C2 networks may include the use of Proxy or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.</p><p>Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents. Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion).</p><p>Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by Resource Development activities such as Acquire Infrastructure and Compromise Infrastructure. For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0411 Detection Strategy for Hide Infrastructure v1.0
AN1148 WindowsMonitor DNS queries, proxy logs, and user-agent strings for anomalous patterns associated with adversary attempts to hide infrastructure. Defenders may observe DNS resolutions to short-lived domains, abnormal WHOIS registration data, or filtering of known defensive/responder IP addresses.dns:query
Excessive lookups for domains with suspicious WHOIS or short TTL values→ DC0101 Domain RegistrationTunable:SuspiciousDomainsResponderIPsAN1149 LinuxDetect adversaries filtering traffic or modifying server responses to evade scanning. Monitor iptables, nftables, or proxy configurations that deny or redirect requests from known scanning agents or defensive tools.auditd:SYSCALLexecve: Execution of commands modifying iptables/nftables to block selective IPs→ DC0032 Process CreationNSM:FlowAltered response metadata or blocked content based on user-agent or geolocation→ DC0106 Response MetadataTunable:BlockedAgentsAN1150 macOSMonitor unified logs for manipulation of proxy configurations, DNS resolution, or filtering rules. Adversaries may redirect responses or use trusted domains that later resolve to malicious C2 infrastructure.NSM:FlowSuspicious changes in TLS certificate responses or redirected domains→ DC0104 Response ContentTunable:TrustedHostingProvidersAN1151 Network DevicesInspect network telemetry for adversary attempts to blend malicious traffic with legitimate flows using VPNs, proxies, or geolocation spoofing. Defensive teams may observe anomalous tunnels, encrypted sessions to suspicious domains, or geo-mismatched IP activity.NSM:FlowEncrypted tunnels or proxy traffic to non-standard destinations→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:GeoIPRangesAN1152 ESXiMonitor VM-level DNS and network traffic logs for adversary-controlled domains or selective response behavior (e.g., dropped requests from security scanners).esxi:vmkernelDNS lookups resolving to domains with rapid changes in registration metadata→ DC0101 Domain Registrationesxi:vmkernelSuspicious traffic filtered or redirected by VM networking stack→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:MonitoredVMs
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1665
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.