Techniques › T1610
T1610 Deploy Container
execution — Containers · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1610
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node.</p><p>Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes. Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0249 Behavior-chain detection for T1610 Deploy Container across Docker & Kubernetes control/node planes v1.0
AN0693 ContainersRemote/API driven creation and start of a container whose image is not on an allow‑list (or is tagged
latest), executed by a non-admin principal, and/or started with risky runtime attributes (e.g.,--privileged, host PID/NET namespaces, sensitive host path mounts, capability adds). Correlates create ➜ start ➜ first network/process actions from that container within a short time window.containerd:runtimeCRI CreateContainer/StartContainer with privileged=true OR added capabilities OR host* namespaces→ DC0077 Container Startebpf:syscallsprocess execution or network connect from just-created container PID namespace→ DC0032 Process Creationdocker:eventsremote API calls to /containers/create or /containers/{id}/start→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:known_imagesknown_adminsTimeWindowRiskThresholdPrivilegedFlags
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1610
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.