Techniques › T1530
T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
collection — IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS · attack.mitre.org · JSON
1
MITRE detection strategy
3
analytics
0
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1530
2
KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.</p><p>Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.</p><p>In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).</p><p>Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.</p><p>This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.</p><p>Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
| CVE | Vendor / product | Mapping type | State | Added |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-49035 | Microsoft Partner Center | primary impact | Mapped | 2025-02-25 |
| CVE-2023-22952 | SugarCRM Multiple Products | secondary impact | Stale | 2023-02-02 |
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0484 Multi-Platform Cloud Storage Exfiltration Behavior Chain v1.0
AN1328 IaaSSpike in object access from new IAM user or role followed by data exfiltration to external IPsAWS:VPCFlowLogs
Unusual volume of data transferred from S3 storage endpoints to non-corporate IPs→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:TimeWindowExternalIPAllowListAN1329 SaaSOAuth token granted to external app followed by download of high-volume files in OneDrive/Google DriveTunable:AppRegistrationNamePatternDownloadThresholdMBAN1330 Office SuiteInternal user account accesses shared links outside org followed by mass file downloadTunable:LinkVisibilityScopeDownloadBurstThreshold
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1530
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content. 2 actively exploited CVEs map here.