{"id":"T1124","name":"System Time Discovery","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124","tactics":["discovery"],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"live":true,"revoked":false,"deprecated":false,"revoked_by":null,"detection_strategies":[{"id":"DET0151","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--98ae5e06-7ea5-49b9-b793-7f97b1d306b2","name":"Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1124 System Time Discovery","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151","analytics":[{"id":"AN0430","stix_id":"x-mitre-analytic--bd34c127-9956-4616-999d-229f30512f74","name":"Analytic 0430","description":"Untrusted or unusual process/script (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w32tm.exe, net.exe, custom binaries) queries system time/timezone (e.g., w32tm /tz, net time \\\\host, Get-TimeZone, GetTickCount API) and (optionally) is followed within a short window by time-based scheduling or conditional execution (e.g., schtasks /create, at.exe, PowerShell Start-Sleep with large values).","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151#AN0430","platforms":["Windows"],"log_source_references":[{"name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4688","data_component":"DC0032","data_component_name":"Process Creation","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-security"},{"name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","data_component":"DC0016","data_component_name":"Module Load","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-sysmon"},{"name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","data_component":"DC0035","data_component_name":"Process Access","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-sysmon"},{"name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","data_component":"DC0039","data_component_name":"File Creation","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-sysmon"},{"name":"WinEventLog:PowerShell","channel":"EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106","data_component":"DC0064","data_component_name":"Command Execution","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-powershell"},{"name":"etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process","channel":"High-frequency or suspicious sequence of QueryPerformanceCounter/GetTickCount API calls from a non-standard process lineage","data_component":"DC0021","data_component_name":"OS API Execution","log_source_slug":"etw-microsoft-windows-kernel-process"},{"name":"WinEventLog:TaskScheduler","channel":"EventCode=106","data_component":"DC0001","data_component_name":"Scheduled Job Creation","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-taskscheduler"},{"name":"WinEventLog:TaskScheduler","channel":"Task registration/execution shortly after a time discovery event","data_component":"DC0005","data_component_name":"Scheduled Job Metadata","log_source_slug":"wineventlog-taskscheduler"},{"name":"EDR:Telemetry","channel":"Process lineage and API usage enrichment (GetSystemTime, GetTimeZoneInformation, NtQuerySystemTime)","data_component":"DC0034","data_component_name":"Process Metadata","log_source_slug":"edr-telemetry"}],"mutable_elements":[{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window (e.g., 5–15 minutes) between time discovery and follow-on scheduling/conditional actions."},{"field":"AllowedParents","description":"Legitimate parent processes (e.g., corporate scripts, management agents) that frequently call time APIs."},{"field":"CommandlineKeywordList","description":"Extend/restrict keyword list for time queries (e.g., custom PS functions, .NET calls)."},{"field":"UserContextScope","description":"Restrict to non-service, non-administrative, or newly created/rare users."},{"field":"ProcessPrevalenceThreshold","description":"Frequency threshold to exclude common estate-wide benign usage."}],"live":true,"detection_strategies":["DET0151"],"techniques":["T1124"]},{"id":"AN0431","stix_id":"x-mitre-analytic--9f2278c6-2e45-42fb-a1f9-00f02d496c53","name":"Analytic 0431","description":"A process (often spawned by a shell, interpreter, or malware implant) executes time discovery via commands (date, timedatectl, hwclock, cat /etc/timezone, /proc/uptime) or direct syscalls (time(), clock_gettime) and is (optionally) followed by scheduled task creation/modification (crontab, at) or conditional sleep logic.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151#AN0431","platforms":["Linux"],"log_source_references":[{"name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"type=EXECVE or SYSCALL for /bin/date, /usr/bin/timedatectl, /sbin/hwclock, /bin/cat /etc/timezone, /bin/cat /proc/uptime","data_component":"DC0032","data_component_name":"Process Creation","log_source_slug":"auditd-syscall"},{"name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Rules capturing clock_gettime, time, gettimeofday syscalls when enabled","data_component":"DC0021","data_component_name":"OS API Execution","log_source_slug":"auditd-syscall"},{"name":"linux:syslog","channel":"sudo/date/timedatectl execution by non-standard users","data_component":"DC0002","data_component_name":"User Account Authentication","log_source_slug":"linux-syslog"},{"name":"linux:cron","channel":"cron activity","data_component":"DC0005","data_component_name":"Scheduled Job Metadata","log_source_slug":"linux-cron"}],"mutable_elements":[{"field":"AuditRulesSyscalls","description":"Scope of syscalls (time, clock_gettime, gettimeofday) monitored; may be performance-sensitive."},{"field":"AllowedBinaries","description":"List of legitimate automation/orchestration tools frequently querying time."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window (e.g., 5–20 minutes) to link time discovery to follow-on cron/at changes."},{"field":"UserContextScope","description":"Ignore root-owned maintenance agents if desired; focus on interactive or newly created users."}],"live":true,"detection_strategies":["DET0151"],"techniques":["T1124"]},{"id":"AN0432","stix_id":"x-mitre-analytic--252e5c07-8ae0-4ef8-9a98-c11b6c6d4d46","name":"Analytic 0432","description":"Process/script execution of systemsetup -gettimezone, date, ioreg, or API usage (timeIntervalSinceNow, gettimeofday) followed by time-based scheduling (launchd plist modification) or sleep-based execution.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151#AN0432","platforms":["macOS"],"log_source_references":[{"name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"process exec events of systemsetup, date, ioreg with command_line parameters indicating time discovery","data_component":"DC0032","data_component_name":"Process Creation","log_source_slug":"macos-unifiedlog"},{"name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"New/modified launchd plist (persistence/scheduling) within TimeWindow after time query","data_component":"DC0005","data_component_name":"Scheduled Job Metadata","log_source_slug":"macos-unifiedlog"}],"mutable_elements":[{"field":"LaunchdPaths","description":"Organization-specific list of allowed launchd write locations to filter benign agents."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window to link time discovery to launchd persistence/scheduling."},{"field":"AllowedCallers","description":"Known management agents (e.g., JAMF) that legitimately call systemsetup/date."}],"live":true,"detection_strategies":["DET0151"],"techniques":["T1124"]},{"id":"AN0433","stix_id":"x-mitre-analytic--2e51d33e-28d3-4e3f-a68a-38bc2d4abdde","name":"Analytic 0433","description":"Interactive or remote shell/API invocation of esxcli system clock get or querying time parameters via hostd/vpxa shortly followed by time/ntp configuration checks or scheduled task creation, executed by non-standard accounts or outside maintenance windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151#AN0433","platforms":["ESXi"],"log_source_references":[{"name":"esxi:shell","channel":"/var/log/shell.log entries containing \"esxcli system clock get\"","data_component":"DC0064","data_component_name":"Command Execution","log_source_slug":"esxi-shell"},{"name":"esxi:hostd","channel":"/var/log/hostd.log API calls reading/altering time/ntp settings","data_component":"DC0034","data_component_name":"Process Metadata","log_source_slug":"esxi-hostd"},{"name":"esxi:syslog","channel":"/var/log/vpxa.log task invocations tied to time configuration","data_component":"DC0005","data_component_name":"Scheduled Job Metadata","log_source_slug":"esxi-syslog"}],"mutable_elements":[{"field":"MaintenanceWindow","description":"Only alert if outside approved ops windows."},{"field":"PrivilegedAccountsAllowList","description":"Suppress alerts for known service accounts."},{"field":"RemoteIPAllowList","description":"Whitelist management station IPs."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation between esxcli time query and subsequent hostd/vpxa config calls."}],"live":true,"detection_strategies":["DET0151"],"techniques":["T1124"]},{"id":"AN0434","stix_id":"x-mitre-analytic--99ab1534-79b5-4660-83ed-3604bcb320f2","name":"Analytic 0434","description":"Non-standard or rare users/locations issue CLI commands like \"show clock detail\" or \"show timezone\"; optionally followed by configuration of time/timezone or NTP sources. AAA/TACACS+ accounting and syslog correlate execution to identity, source IP, and privilege level.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0151#AN0434","platforms":["Network Devices"],"log_source_references":[{"name":"networkdevice:syslog","channel":"command-exec: CLI commands containing \"show clock\", \"show clock detail\", \"show timezone\" executed by suspicious user/source","data_component":"DC0064","data_component_name":"Command Execution","log_source_slug":"networkdevice-syslog"},{"name":"networkdevice:config","channel":"config-change: timezone or ntp server configuration change after a time query command","data_component":"DC0061","data_component_name":"File Modification","log_source_slug":"networkdevice-config"}],"mutable_elements":[{"field":"AllowedAdminSubnets","description":"Only alert on access from outside the NOC/management subnets."},{"field":"KnownMaintenanceUsers","description":"Whitelist known automation/orchestration accounts."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window between time query and config change."}],"live":true,"detection_strategies":["DET0151"],"techniques":["T1124"]}],"live":true,"version":"1.0","techniques":["T1124"]}],"sigma_rules":[{"id":"6da2c9f5-7c53-401b-aacb-92c040ce1215","title":"Use of W32tm as Timer","author":"frack113","status":"test","level":"high","date":"2022-09-25","modified":null,"description":"When configured with suitable command line arguments, w32tm can act as a delay mechanism","references":["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/d0dad62dbcae9c60c519368e82c196a3db577055/atomics/T1124/T1124.md","https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/05/dirty-deeds-done-dirt-cheap-russian-rat-offers-backdoor-bargains"],"logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"tags":["attack.discovery","attack.t1124"],"path":"rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_w32tm.yml","techniques":["T1124"],"cves":[]},{"id":"9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b","title":"Cisco Discovery","author":"Austin Clark","status":"test","level":"low","date":"2019-08-12","modified":"2023-01-04","description":"Find information about network devices that is not stored in config files","references":["https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/server_nw_virtual/2-5_release/command_reference/show.html"],"logsource":{"product":"cisco","service":"aaa"},"tags":["attack.discovery","attack.t1083","attack.t1201","attack.t1057","attack.t1018","attack.t1082","attack.t1016","attack.t1049","attack.t1033","attack.t1124"],"path":"rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_discovery.yml","techniques":["T1083","T1201","T1057","T1018","T1082","T1016","T1049","T1033","T1124"],"cves":[]},{"id":"b243b280-65fe-48df-ba07-6ddea7646427","title":"Discovery of a System Time","author":"E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community","status":"test","level":"low","date":"2019-10-24","modified":"2022-06-28","description":"Identifies use of various commands to query a systems time. This technique may be used before executing a scheduled task or to discover the time zone of a target system.","references":["https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fcdb99c2-ac3c-4bde-b664-4b336329bed2.html","https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1124/T1124.md"],"logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"tags":["attack.discovery","attack.t1124"],"path":"rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_time_discovery.yml","techniques":["T1124"],"cves":[]}],"kev_cves":[],"_built":"2026-08-23 05:47 UTC","_attack_version":"19.2","_sigma_commit":"da9bb07d642a2826e89702445d32c795209ec108"}