Coverage › CVE-2022-24682
CVE-2022-24682 Mapped Sigma
Synacor Zimbra Collaborate Suite (ZCS) Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
- Vendor / product
- Synacor — Zimbra Collaborate Suite (ZCS)
- Description (CISA)
- Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) contains a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Calendar feature that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
- Added to KEV
- 2022-02-25
- Due date
- 2022-03-11
- Required action
- Apply updates per vendor instructions.
- Known ransomware use
- Known
- CWE
- CWE-79, CWE-116
- CISA notes
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24682
- Elsewhere
- cve.org · NVD · CISA KEV · JSON
ATT&CK techniques · CTID Mappings Explorer, ATT&CK 16.1, KEV snapshot 2025-07-28
3 mapping objects across 3 techniques. exploitation technique states how the vulnerability is exploited; primary and secondary impact state what exploitation achieves. They are different claims and are labelled as such.
| Technique | Mapping type | CTID comment | Status in v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1204.001 Malicious Link | exploitation technique | This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker via spear-phishing emails containing malicious links to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the document by placing executable JavaScript inside element attributes. This results in unescaped markup, enabling the attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session, leading to potential data theft and other malicious activities.
This vulnerability was identified by Volexity in December 2021 during a series of targeted spear-phishing campaigns conducted by a threat actor tracked as TEMP_Heretic. The campaigns aimed to exploit this zero-day vulnerability, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session.
The attack involved two phases: an initial reconnaissance phase using emails with embedded remote images to track if targets opened the messages, and a second phase with spear-phishing emails containing malicious links. If a target clicked on these links while logged into the Zimbra webmail client, the attacker could exploit the vulnerability to steal email data and attachments. ref 1 |
live |
| T1059.007 JavaScript | primary impact | This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker via spear-phishing emails containing malicious links to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the document by placing executable JavaScript inside element attributes. This results in unescaped markup, enabling the attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session, leading to potential data theft and other malicious activities.
This vulnerability was identified by Volexity in December 2021 during a series of targeted spear-phishing campaigns conducted by a threat actor tracked as TEMP_Heretic. The campaigns aimed to exploit this zero-day vulnerability, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session.
The attack involved two phases: an initial reconnaissance phase using emails with embedded remote images to track if targets opened the messages, and a second phase with spear-phishing emails containing malicious links. If a target clicked on these links while logged into the Zimbra webmail client, the attacker could exploit the vulnerability to steal email data and attachments. ref 1 |
live |
| T1185 Browser Session Hijacking | secondary impact | This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker via spear-phishing emails containing malicious links to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the document by placing executable JavaScript inside element attributes. This results in unescaped markup, enabling the attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session, leading to potential data theft and other malicious activities.
This vulnerability was identified by Volexity in December 2021 during a series of targeted spear-phishing campaigns conducted by a threat actor tracked as TEMP_Heretic. The campaigns aimed to exploit this zero-day vulnerability, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's Zimbra session.
The attack involved two phases: an initial reconnaissance phase using emails with embedded remote images to track if targets opened the messages, and a second phase with spear-phishing emails containing malicious links. If a target clicked on these links while logged into the Zimbra webmail client, the attacker could exploit the vulnerability to steal email data and attachments. ref 1 |
live |
Detection chain · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2 detection strategies, analytics, log sources
T1059.007 JavaScript primary impact
- DET0264 Cross-Platform Detection of JavaScript Execution Abuse
AN0733 WindowsDetects JavaScript execution through WSH (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or HTA (mshta.exe), particularly when spawned from Office macros, web browsers, or abnormal user paths. Correlates script execution with outbound network activity or system modification.Tunable:
ParentProcessScriptPathTimeWindowUserContextEntropyScoreAN0734 macOSDetects JavaScript for Automation (JXA) via osascript or compiled scripts using OSAKit APIs. Flags execution involving system modification, inter-process scripting, or browser abuse.macos:unifiedloglog stream with predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "osascript"'→ DC0029 Script ExecutionTunable:ScriptLocationParentProcessAPIInvocationAN0735 LinuxDetects Node.js or JavaScript interpreter execution from web shells, cron jobs, or local users. Correlates execution with reverse shell behavior, file modifications, or abnormal outbound connections.Tunable:ScriptPathBinaryNameUserExecutionContextNetworkFollowUp
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1059.007 (29)
Author: Tim Shelton
· 2022-01-10 (modified 2026-02-17) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127
Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
· 2019-10-21 (modified 2026-01-24) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2017-11-10 (modified 2022-12-02) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-25 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
Author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r), Red Canary (idea)
· 2023-08-22 · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 13db8d2e-7723-4c2c-93c1-a4d36994f7ef
Detects potential in-memory downloading and compiling of applets using curl and osacompile as seen used by XCSSET malware
Author: Michael Haag
· 2019-01-16 (modified 2026-02-17) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1e33157c-53b1-41ad-bbcc-780b80b58288
Detects script file execution (.js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, .wsf, .wsh) by Wscript/Cscript.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2017-11-10 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
Author: Leonardo Gasparini
· 2026-05-12 · logsource: product=linux category=file_event · 2b5e4d3f-7c9a-4fab-a8d1-3e6f5a7b8c9d
Detects file creation indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai and uipath reported on early May 2026.
Author: @SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)
· 2019-02-01 (modified 2023-05-05) · logsource: product=windows category=create_remote_thread · 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
Author: Leonardo Gasparini
· 2026-05-12 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 3c6f5e4a-8d0b-6abc-d9e2-4f7a6b8c9d0e
Detects process execution indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai and uipath reported on early May 2026.
The preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime.
Author: Pushkarev Dmitry
· 2020-06-28 (modified 2025-12-03) · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
Author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2020-04-01 (modified 2023-04-12) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Author: heyyanu
· 2026-03-26 · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 557e3bd3-7f21-495d-8d50-7c8bdfb8041c
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Author: wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2020-01-12 (modified 2023-02-11) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
Author: Josh Nickels, Michael Taggart
· 2025-05-22 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 6c0ce3b6-85e2-49d4-9c3f-6e008ce9796e
Detects Deno writing a file from a direct HTTP(s) call and writing to the appdata folder or bringing it's own malicious DLL.
This behavior may indicate an attempt to execute remotely hosted, potentially malicious files through deno.
All 29 rules on the technique page →
T1185 Browser Session Hijacking secondary impact
- DET0507 Detect browser session hijacking via privilege, handle access, and remote thread into browsers
AN1398 WindowsAdversary gains high integrity or special privileges (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege), locates a running browser process, opens it with write/inject rights, and modifies it (e.g., CreateRemoteThread / DLL load) to inherit cookies/tokens or establish a browser pivot. Optional step: create a new logon session or use explicit credentials, then drive the victim browser to intranet resources.Tunable:
BrowserListAccessMaskSetSignerAllowListInternalCIDRTimeWindowParentAllowListUserContext
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1185 (2)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-12-23 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 3e8207c5-fcd2-4ea6-9418-15d45b4890e4
Detects chromium based browsers starting in headless and debugging mode and pointing to a user profile. This could be a sign of data stealing or remote control
Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-07-27 (modified 2022-12-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449
Detects browsers starting with the remote debugging flags. Which is a technique often used to perform browser injection attacks
T1204.001 Malicious Link exploitation technique
- DET0066 User Execution – Malicious Link (click → suspicious egress → download/write → follow-on activity)
AN0178 WindowsBehavioral chain: (1) a user-facing app (browser/Office/email client) launches a URL or handles a link, then (2) the same process lineage makes an outbound connection to an untrusted domain/IP, (3) a file is downloaded or unpacked to a user-writable location shortly after the click. Optional enrichment: subsequent child execution by LOLBINs.NSM:Flow
Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, short-lived domains, URL shorteners; HTTP method GET/POST→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:TimeWindowBrowserParentsUserPathsSuspiciousTLDsAllowedCDNsAN0179 LinuxBehavioral chain: (1) browser/office/GUI mail client opens a URL, (2) outbound connection to untrusted domain, (3) a new file is saved in $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or cache immediately after.auditd:SYSCALLexecve: Execs of chromium, google-chrome, firefox, libreoffice with http(s) in cmdline→ DC0082 Network Connection Creationauditd:SYSCALLopen,creat,rename: Writes in $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, ~/.cache with exe/script/archive/office extensions→ DC0039 File CreationTunable:TimeWindowUserPathsHighRiskExtensionsDomainRiskScoreAN0180 macOSBehavioral chain: (1) Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Office handles a URL; unified logs show open/click or LSQuarantine assignment, (2) outbound connection to untrusted domain, (3) a new file appears in ~/Downloads or /private/var/folders/* with quarantine flag.NSM:ConnectionsNew outbound connection from Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Word→ DC0082 Network Connection Creationfs:fseventsCreate in /Users/*/Downloads or /private/var/folders/* with quarantine attribute→ DC0039 File CreationTunable:TimeWindowQuarantinePolicySuspiciousTLDs
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1204.001 (4)
Author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
· 2022-10-21 (modified 2022-12-28) · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4
Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-04-05 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=linux · c67fc22a-0be5-4b4f-aad5-2b32c4b69523
Detects suspicious command lines that look as if they would create symbolic links to /etc/passwd
Author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-19 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-03-25 (modified 2025-11-19) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTTP/HTTPS links.
ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages.
Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content,
such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts.