Coverage › CVE-2015-3113
CVE-2015-3113 Mapped Partial Sigma
Adobe Flash Player Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
- Vendor / product
- Adobe — Flash Player
- Description (CISA)
- Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player allows remote attackers to execute code.
- Added to KEV
- 2022-04-13
- Due date
- 2022-05-04
- Required action
- The impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use.
- Known ransomware use
- Unknown
- CWE
- CWE-119
- CISA notes
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3113
- Elsewhere
- cve.org · NVD · CISA KEV · JSON
ATT&CK techniques · CTID Mappings Explorer, ATT&CK 16.1, KEV snapshot 2025-07-28
4 mapping objects across 4 techniques. exploitation technique states how the vulnerability is exploited; primary and secondary impact state what exploitation achieves. They are different claims and are labelled as such.
| Technique | Mapping type | CTID comment | Status in v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1204.002 Malicious File | exploitation technique | This heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited by having a user open a maliciously-crafted file.
In the wild, this exploitation has been used in order to establish command and control (over HTTP) with a target system. The command and control functionality has also been seen to employ debugging/sandboxing evasion. ref 1 · ref 2 |
live |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols | primary impact | This heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited by having a user open a maliciously-crafted file.
In the wild, this exploitation has been used in order to establish command and control (over HTTP) with a target system. The command and control functionality has also been seen to employ debugging/sandboxing evasion. ref 1 · ref 2 |
live |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | secondary impact | This heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited by having a user open a maliciously-crafted file.
In the wild, this exploitation has been used in order to establish command and control (over HTTP) with a target system. The command and control functionality has also been seen to employ debugging/sandboxing evasion. ref 1 · ref 2 |
live |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion | secondary impact | This heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited by having a user open a maliciously-crafted file.
In the wild, this exploitation has been used in order to establish command and control (over HTTP) with a target system. The command and control functionality has also been seen to employ debugging/sandboxing evasion. ref 1 · ref 2 |
live |
Detection chain · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2 detection strategies, analytics, log sources
T1071.001 Web Protocols primary impact
- DET0027 Detection of Web Protocol-Based C2 Over HTTP, HTTPS, or WebSockets
AN0075 WindowsDetects unexpected or high-volume HTTP/S/WebSocket communication from suspicious processes (e.g., PowerShell, rundll32) using uncommon user agents or mimicking browser traffic to unusual domains or IPs.Tunable:
ProcessNameExclusionsUserAgentAnomaliesOutboundByteRatioThresholdAN0076 LinuxDetects curl, wget, Python requests, or custom HTTP clients communicating over non-standard ports, with repetitive or beacon-like patterns or POST-heavy behavior to rare domains.Tunable:CommandLinePatternMatchBeaconIntervalWindowAN0077 macOSDetects applications such as Automator, AppleScript, or LaunchDaemons invoking HTTP/S traffic to non-standard domains or using suspicious headers (e.g., Base64 in URIs or cookie fields).Tunable:SuspiciousParentProcessURIEntropyThresholdAN0078 ESXiDetects HTTP or HTTPS communication initiated by shell-based scripts or management daemons, especially those reaching public IPs over ports 80/443 using embedded curl or wget.Tunable:ShellScriptMatchExternalConnectionFilterAN0079 Network DevicesDetects Web protocol misuse such as encoded HTTP headers, WebSocket upgrade requests with abnormal payloads, or TLS handshake anomalies suggesting embedded C2 channels.Tunable:HeaderEncodingPatternTLSFingerprintMismatch
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1071.001 (42)
Author: citron_ninja
· 2023-10-25 (modified 2023-11-20) · logsource: product=windows category=dns_query · 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-07-08 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: category=proxy · 21e44d78-95e7-421b-a464-ffd8395659c4
Detects a potentially suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy log.
Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2020-04-15 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: category=proxy · 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-09-28 (modified 2025-10-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 2cf29f11-e356-4f61-98c0-1bdb9393d6da
Detects renamed Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-06-09 (modified 2024-02-15) · logsource: category=proxy · 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-10-25 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 30bf1789-379d-4fdc-900f-55cd0a90a801
Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
Author: frack113
· 2022-01-23 (modified 2023-02-21) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 3286d37a-00fd-41c2-a624-a672dcd34e60
Detects execution of curl.exe with custom useragent options
Author: CertainlyP
· 2024-04-26 · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · 37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
Author: Mike Wade
· 2020-09-16 (modified 2022-03-24) · logsource: category=dns · 3eaf6218-3bed-4d8a-8707-274096f12a18
Detects wannacry killswitch domain dns queries
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-12-05 (modified 2023-01-19) · logsource: category=proxy · 5468045b-4fcc-4d1a-973c-c9c9578edacb
Detects direct access to raw pastes in different paste services often used by malware in their second stages to download malicious code in encrypted or encoded form
Author: Thomas Patzke
· 2019-11-12 (modified 2023-05-18) · logsource: category=proxy · 5ba715b6-71b7-44fd-8245-f66893e81b3d
Detects suspicious user agent string of APT40 Dropbox tool
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-07-08 (modified 2024-04-14) · logsource: category=proxy · 5c84856b-55a5-45f1-826f-13f37250cf4e
Detects suspicious user agent strings used by malware in proxy logs
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
· 2019-11-12 (modified 2024-02-15) · logsource: category=proxy · 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-07-08 (modified 2022-10-31) · logsource: category=proxy · 7195a772-4b3f-43a4-a210-6a003d65caa1
Detects suspicious malformed user agent strings in proxy logs
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-04-01 · logsource: category=dns · 73e5d24f-493f-4092-bd2f-c72cabda40ee
Detects DNS queries for the malicious C2 domain associated with the plain-crypto-js/Axios npm package supply chain compromise.
On March 30, 2026, malicious versions (1.14.1, 0.30.4) were published to npm, injecting a dependency (plain-crypto-js@4.2.1) that executed a postinstall script as a cross-platform RAT dropper.
This detection detects endpoints attempting to resolve the attacker's C2 domain (sfrclak.com) used for command and control communication.
All 42 rules on the technique page →
T1204.002 Malicious File exploitation technique
- DET0294 User Execution – Malicious File via download/open → spawn chain (T1204.002)
AN0819 WindowsUser opens a file delivered by email, web, chat, or share. The handler application (Word/PDF reader/archiver) creates a file in user-controlled paths (Downloads, Temp, Desktop) and then spawns a new or unusual child process (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe). Optional precursors include FileStreamCreated (URL/UNC) and Office → system32 batch writes.Tunable:
TimeWindowSuspiciousExtensionsUserPathsParentAppsSignerAllowListAN0820 macOSUser opens a downloaded document/installer leading to EndpointSecurity file create in ~/Downloads or ~/Library paths then an exec of a suspicious utility (osascript, bash/zsh, curl, chmod, open with -a Terminal). Correlates File Creation with subsequent process exec and, optionally, quarantine/LSQuarantine events.macos:unifiedlogprocess_exec: image in {/bin/bash,/bin/zsh,/usr/bin/osascript,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/open} AND parent in {Preview, TextEdit, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, AdobeReader, Archive Utility, Finder}→ DC0032 Process Creationmacos:endpointsecurityES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE: path under /Users/*/(Downloads|Desktop|Library/*/Containers|Library/Group Containers) AND extension in SuspiciousExtensions→ DC0039 File CreationTunable:TimeWindowQuarantineRequiredParentAppsAN0821 LinuxUser or desktop application writes a new file to ~/Downloads, /tmp, or mounted removable media followed by execve of a risky interpreter/loader (bash, sh, python, perl, php, node, curl|wget piping to sh, ld.so, rdesktop, xdg-open - with unusual args). Uses auditd PATH+SYSCALL (open/creat/write/rename) with execve event linking.auditd:SYSCALLopen/create/rename: name in (/home/*/Downloads/*|/tmp/*|/run/user/*|/media/*) AND ext in SuspiciousExtensions→ DC0039 File Creationauditd:SYSCALLexecve: exe in {/bin/bash,/bin/sh,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/perl,/usr/bin/php,/usr/bin/node,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/wget,/usr/bin/xdg-open,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/rundll32 (wine)} AND ppid process is a document viewer/browser→ DC0032 Process CreationTunable:TimeWindowDesktopParentMap
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1204.002 (39)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-11-07 (modified 2023-05-18) · logsource: category=proxy · 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
Author: Joseph Kamau
· 2024-05-27 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1193d960-2369-499f-a158-7b50a31df682
Detects when a browser process or browser tab is launched from an application that handles document files such as Adobe, Microsoft Office, etc. And connects to a web application over http(s), this could indicate a possible phishing attempt.
Author: Steffen Rogge (dr0pd34d)
· 2024-07-10 · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 1337afba-d17d-4d23-bd55-29b927603b30
Detects Microsoft Word loading an Add-In (.wll) file which can be used by threat actors for initial access or persistence.
Author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
· 2022-02-28 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-08-10 (modified 2025-10-12) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
Author: Michael Haag, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-03 · logsource: product=windows service=appxdeployment-server · 289dfa9e-e378-4a56-a9d4-7ed5ee218029
Detects successful MSIX/AppX package installations on Windows systems by monitoring EventID 854 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational log.
While most installations are legitimate, this can help identify unauthorized or suspicious package installations.
It is crucial to monitor such events as threat actors may exploit MSIX/AppX packages to deliver and execute malicious payloads.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2020-05-08 (modified 2023-02-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052
Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers
Author: Leonardo Gasparini
· 2026-05-12 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 3c6f5e4a-8d0b-6abc-d9e2-4f7a6b8c9d0e
Detects process execution indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai and uipath reported on early May 2026.
The preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime.
Author: Pushkarev Dmitry
· 2020-06-28 (modified 2025-12-03) · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
· 2018-04-06 (modified 2023-04-24) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-10-25 (modified 2022-08-08) · logsource: category=proxy · 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
Author: heyyanu
· 2026-03-26 · logsource: product=windows service=applocker · 557e3bd3-7f21-495d-8d50-7c8bdfb8041c
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
· 2020-05-02 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 60936b49-fca0-4f32-993d-7415edcf9a5d
A General detection for a new application in AppCompat. This indicates an application executing for the first time on an endpoint.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-11-23 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 678eb5f4-8597-4be6-8be7-905e4234b53a
Detects exploits that use CVE-2017-11882 to start EQNEDT32.EXE and other sub processes like mshta.exe
Author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
· 2023-01-31 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
All 39 rules on the technique page →
T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion secondary impact
- DET0046 Detection Strategy for T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
AN0127 WindowsExecution of discovery commands or API calls for virtualization artifacts (e.g., registry keys, device drivers, services), sleep/skipped execution behavior, or sandbox evasion DLLs before payload deployment.Tunable:
TimeWindowKnownVMArtifactListAN0128 LinuxExecution of commands to enumerate virtualization-related files or processes (e.g., '/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name', dmesg, lscpu, lspci), or querying hypervisor interfaces prior to malware execution.auditd:SYSCALLexecve or syscall invoking vm artifact check commands (e.g., dmidecode, lspci, dmesg)→ DC0032 Process Creationauditd:SYSCALLsleep function usage or loops (nanosleep, usleep) in scripts→ DC0064 Command ExecutionTunable:TimeWindowCommandArtifactMatchListAN0129 macOSExecution of scripts or binaries that check for virtualization indicators (e.g., system_profiler, ioreg -l, kextstat), combined with delay functions or anomalous launchd activity.macos:unifiedlogexecution of system_profiler, ioreg, kextstat with argument patterns related to VM/sandbox checks→ DC0032 Process Creationmacos:unifiedlogdynamic loading of sleep-related functions or sandbox detection libraries→ DC0016 Module LoadTunable:ProcessCommandPatternSleepThreshold
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1497 (0)
None. MITRE's strategy above is the only public detection guidance for this technique.
T1622 Debugger Evasion secondary impact
- DET0371 Detection Strategy for Debugger Evasion (T1622)
AN1045 WindowsMonitor for suspicious use of Windows API calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or processes manually checking the BeingDebugged flag in the Process Environment Block (PEB). Detect sequences of OutputDebugStringW() calls in short intervals that may indicate debugger flooding attempts.Tunable:
ApiCallFrequencyThresholdProcessAllowListAN1046 LinuxMonitor access to /proc/self/status where TracerPID field is queried, as this is a common technique for debugger detection. Detect processes that attempt to trigger exceptions intentionally and monitor whether exception handling indicates presence of a debugger.auditd:SYSCALLopen/read: Access to /proc/self/status with focus on TracerPID field→ DC0055 File AccessTunable:MonitoredPathsSyscallThresholdAN1047 macOSDetect suspicious calls to sysctl or ptrace API used to determine if a process is being debugged. Monitor for processes that flood OutputDebugString equivalents or generate abnormal exceptions to evade analysis.macos:unifiedlogptrace: Processes invoking ptrace with PTRACE_TRACEME flag→ DC0021 OS API ExecutionTunable:PtraceInvocationThresholdDevToolExclusionList
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1622 (1)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-10 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42
Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc).
Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.