Techniques › T1700 › AN2080
AN2080 Analytic 2080
Linux · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0
<p>An analyst observes an AI-associated process access data outside $AuthorizedAIDataScope$, followed within $EndpointExfilWindow$ by transfer-capable execution and an outbound connection from the same lineage to a destination outside $AuthorizedAIEndpoints$.</p>
- Detects
- T1700 AI-Enabled Exfiltration
- Part of
- DET0927 Detect AI-Enabled Exfiltration
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| auditd:SYSCALL | open/read | DC0055 File Access |
| auditd:SYSCALL | EXECVE | DC0032 Process Creation |
| auditd:SYSCALL | connect | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
AuthorizedAIDataScope | data paths/classes the AI application/service identity is permitted to access; derive from application design, IAM and data policy |
ExpectedAIProcessTree | approved AI parent/child relationships from clean executions |
AuthorizedAIEndpoints | legitimate service/repository/API destinations |
EndpointExfilWindow | access→execution→egress timing derived from clean workflows |