Techniques › T1011.001 › AN1533
AN1533 Analytic 1533
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Observation of
blueutil/networksetup commands or low-level APIs toggling Bluetooth or initiating transfers, especially if paired with recent large file read activity by non-GUI processes.</p>- Detects
- T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
- Part of
- DET0554 Detection of Bluetooth-Based Data Exfiltration
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | None | DC0064 Command Execution |
| macos:osquery | None | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| macos:osquery | None | DC0055 File Access |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
ProcessContext | Limit to background processes or scripts with no GUI interaction. |
PayloadType | Focus on specific sensitive file types (e.g., zip, docx, keychain db). |