Techniques › T1218.005 › AN1397
AN1397 Analytic 1397
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detection of mshta.exe execution where command-line arguments reference remote or local HTA/script content (VBScript/JScript) followed by subsequent file creation, network retrieval, or process spawning that indicates payload execution outside standard Internet Explorer security context. Correlation includes parent process lineage, command-line inspection, and network connection creation to untrusted or anomalous endpoints.</p>
- Detects
- T1218.005 Mshta
- Part of
- DET0506 Detecting Mshta-based Proxy Execution via Suspicious HTA or Script Invocation
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
CommandLinePattern | Regex patterns for mshta.exe arguments referencing remote HTA/script content; may need tuning to exclude known-good internal scripts. |
SuspiciousParentProcesses | List of parent processes considered suspicious when spawning mshta.exe (e.g., Office applications, script interpreters). |
AllowedHTASources | Whitelist of domains/paths from which legitimate HTAs are executed. |
TimeWindow | Time threshold for correlating mshta.exe execution with subsequent network connections or file creations. |