Techniques › T1574.012 › AN1319
AN1319 Analytic 1319
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Modification of COR_PROFILER-related environment variables or Registry keys (COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, COR_PROFILER_PATH), combined with anomalous .NET process creation or unmanaged DLL loads. Defender observes registry modifications, suspicious process creation with altered environment variables, and profiler DLLs loaded unexpectedly into .NET CLR processes.</p>
- Detects
- T1574.012 COR_PROFILER
- Part of
- DET0479 Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow using the Windows COR_PROFILER.
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4657 | DC0063 Windows Registry Key Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 | DC0016 Module Load |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
AllowedProfilers | List of known good COR_PROFILER CLSIDs and DLLs expected in developer or monitoring environments. |
ProcessScope | Processes expected to load COR_PROFILER (e.g., Visual Studio) for baseline comparison. |
TimeWindow | Interval between registry modification or file creation and profiler DLL load into .NET processes. |
ProfilerDllPaths | Directories considered legitimate for profiler DLLs; deviations should raise alerts. |