Techniques › T1090.003 › AN1020
AN1020 Analytic 1020
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Suspicious processes (e.g., Tor clients, relays, unknown binaries) launch with sustained encrypted outbound traffic to known anonymity infrastructure (e.g., Tor, I2P), and may relay to additional internal systems via reverse proxying, ICMP tunneling, or socket forwarding.</p>
- Detects
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- Part of
- DET0359 Multi-hop Proxy Behavior via Relay Node Chaining, Onion Routing, and Network Tunneling
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| dns:query | Outbound resolution to hidden service domains (e.g., `.onion`) | DC0078 Network Traffic Flow |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
DomainCategory | Can be tuned to `.onion`, I2P, or suspicious CDN domains. |
ProcessParent | Detect known-good vs. abnormal launching binaries (e.g., mshta spawning Tor). |
ConnectionDuration | Threshold for persistent connections over known relay ports (e.g., 9050). |