Techniques › T1027.011 › AN0973
AN0973 Analytic 0973
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects abuse of fileless storage mechanisms such as Registry keys, WMI classes, and Event Logs used to stage payloads, scripts, or encoded content outside traditional files.</p>
- Detects
- T1027.011 Fileless Storage
- Part of
- DET0344 Detection Strategy for Fileless Storage via Registry, WMI, and Shared Memory
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4657 | DC0063 Windows Registry Key Modification |
| WinEventLog:Application | WMI Object Creation Events | DC0008 WMI Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
RegistryPathFilter | Scoped to suspicious or abused paths like HKCU\Software\Classes\ or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ |
PayloadEntropyThreshold | Minimum entropy level to flag suspicious registry or WMI content as encoded payloads |
TimeWindow | Temporal window for correlating WMI/registry modifications with process creation or network usage |