Techniques › T1542.002 › AN0918
AN0918 Analytic 0918
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detection of EFI/firmware manipulation attempts via abnormal driver loads, unsigned kexts, or tampered NVRAM variables associated with component firmware configuration.</p>
- Detects
- T1542.002 Component Firmware
- Part of
- DET0323 Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | Firmware update events or kernel extension (kext) loads not signed by Apple | DC0004 Firmware Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
ApprovedKextList | List of trusted and signed kexts permitted in production systems |
EFIHashBaseline | Known-clean EFI image hashes used for verification |