Techniques › T1027.016 › AN0915
AN0915 Analytic 0915
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Identifies Mach-O binaries dropped into temporary directories with abnormally high binary size or padding patterns, followed by privilege escalation,
exec, or memory mapping of other processes.</p>- Detects
- T1027.016 Junk Code Insertion
- Part of
- DET0322 Detection Strategy for Junk Code Obfuscation with Suspicious Execution Patterns
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:endpointsecurity | ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC | DC0032 Process Creation |
| macos:endpointsecurity | ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP | DC0020 Process Modification |
| macos:endpointsecurity | ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN | DC0035 Process Access |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TempFilePaths | Track dropped executables in ~/Library/, /tmp/, or /private/tmp/ |
MachOPaddingThreshold | Define padding size or section entropy anomalies in Mach-O file format |
FollowOnPrivilegeEscalation | Detects whether the binary attempts privilege escalation within short execution window |