Techniques › T1052.001 › AN0618
AN0618 Analytic 0618
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects external volume mount with Finder, Terminal, or script-initiated file copy from user profiles, sensitive folders, or cloud storage sync directories to USB.</p>
- Detects
- T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB
- Part of
- DET0220 Detection of USB-Based Data Exfiltration
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | Volume Mount + Process Trace + File Read | DC0042 Drive Creation |
| fs:fsusage | Disk Activity Tracing | DC0055 File Access |
| macos:osquery | process_events | DC0032 Process Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
DriveLabelFilter | Flag removable volumes with suspicious or default names (e.g., NO NAME, BACKUP_01). |
ScriptExecutionContext | Watch for shell or AppleScript execution tied to USB copy. |
VolumeMountFrequency | Detect repeated or abnormal device mounts during work hours. |