Techniques › T1611 › AN0612
AN0612 Analytic 0612
Containers · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detection of container escape attempts via bind mounts, privileged containers, or abuse of docker.sock. Defenders may observe anomalous volume mount configurations (e.g., hostPath to / or /proc), unexpected privileged container launches, or use of container administration commands to access host resources. These events typically correlate with subsequent process execution on the host outside of normal container isolation.</p>
- Detects
- T1611 Escape to Host
- Part of
- DET0219 Detection Strategy for Escape to Host
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| docker:daemon | container create/start with privileged flag or host volume mount | DC0072 Container Creation |
| kubernetes:apiserver | Pod spec with hostPath or privileged securityContext | DC0092 Volume Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
AllowedHostPaths | List of directories permitted for hostPath volumes. Any access beyond these paths may be suspicious. |
PrivilegedContainerThreshold | Number of privileged container launches expected in the environment. Exceeding this may indicate adversary behavior. |
KEV CVEs whose mapped technique this analytic detects
| CVE | Vendor / product | State |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-22224 | VMware ESXi and Workstation | Mapped |
| CVE-2025-22225 | VMware ESXi | Mapped |
| CVE-2025-22226 | VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion | Mapped |