Techniques › T1496.004 › AN0417
AN0417 Analytic 0417
SaaS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Adversary gains access to cloud-hosted services such as AWS SES, SNS, or OpenAI API, enables or modifies usage policies, and initiates resource-intensive actions (e.g., mass email/SMS or LLM queries), often from unauthorized regions or under anomalous identity conditions.</p>
- Detects
- T1496.004 Cloud Service Hijacking
- Part of
- DET0147 Detection Strategy for Cloud Service Hijacking via SaaS Abuse
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| AWS:CloudTrail | PutIdentityPolicy | DC0069 Cloud Service Modification |
| AWS:CloudTrail | SendEmail | DC0038 Application Log Content |
| AWS:CloudTrail | AssumeRole | DC0013 User Account Metadata |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TimeWindow | Define threshold period over which request spikes are measured. E.g., 10 min or 1 hour windows. |
UserContext | Alert only if role/user is outside expected automation identity list. |
RequestVolumeThreshold | Customize the number of emails/SMS or API calls considered anomalous. |
GeoVelocityThreshold | Tune geolocation jump logic (e.g., login from US, then use service in Asia within minutes). |
ModelUsageQuotaSpike | Set maximum allowable deviation from past 7-day average OpenAI/GPT token usage. |