Techniques › T1555.004 › AN0378
AN0378 Analytic 0378
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager through anomalous process execution (vaultcmd.exe, rundll32.exe keymgr.dll), suspicious API calls (CredEnumerateA), or direct file access to Credential Locker files. Correlates process creation with subsequent file reads of .vcrd/.vpol files under user Credential Locker directories.</p>
- Detects
- T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager
- Part of
- DET0134 Detect Suspicious Access to Windows Credential Manager
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 | DC0035 Process Access |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=15 | DC0059 File Metadata |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
MonitoredPaths | Credential Locker paths such as %Systemdrive%\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials and %Systemdrive%\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault |
TimeWindow | Correlation window between process execution, file access, and API calls |
PrivilegedUsers | Baseline of expected administrative/service accounts with legitimate Credential Manager access |