Techniques › T1546.001 › AN0170
AN0170 Analytic 0170
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects modification of registry keys used for default file handlers, followed by anomalous process execution from user-initiated file opens. This includes tracking changes under HKCU and HKCR for file extension mappings, and correlating them with new or suspicious handler paths launching unusual child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript).</p>
- Detects
- T1546.001 Change Default File Association
- Part of
- DET0061 Detect Default File Association Hijack via Registry & Execution Correlation on Windows
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=13, 14 | DC0063 Windows Registry Key Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4672 | DC0088 Logon Session Metadata |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TimeWindow | Defines how long after the registry modification to correlate a suspicious process execution |
UserContext | Tune to ignore known admin or installer behavior in specific user profiles |
SuspiciousHandlerPathRegex | Pattern match for suspicious handler paths (e.g., powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) |